### 1

**Interpretation – Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through a plan defending the effects of federal government action.**

**“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means**

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Violation – They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action. That undermines preparation and clash because it justifies aff conditionality. Changing the question now leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow, uneducational debate. Requiring debate on a communal topic forces argument development and develops persuasive skills critical to any political outcome.

Framework comes first—a common starting point for key to productive discussion

**Shively ‘2K**

(Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2)

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The **ambiguists** must say "no" to-they **must reject and limit-some ideas**and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. **The mistake is in thinking that agreement** marks the end of contest-that consensus **kills debate**. **But** this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, **our agreements are highly imperfect**. **We agree** on some matters but not on others, **on generalities but not on specifics**, on principles but not **on their applications,** and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: **ifwe cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument** or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, **one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group.** One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless** if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and **debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and**/or the **termsof their disagreements.** The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might** go about intelligibly **contesting it**. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

### 2

Marx’s insight has been all but discarded by the new left, with its emphasis on being postmodern, postcolonial, poststructural, postMarxist, or post-anything. This post-al politics of the contemporary left focuses on discourse and language at the expense of analyzing real material conditions. This post-al logic is complicit with capitalism, especially insofar as it obscures the operation of political economy and the material reality of capitalism

**Zavarzadeh, Dept English @ Syracuse, 1994**

(Mas’ud, “The Stupidity that Consumption is Just as Productive as Production”, The Alternative

Orange, V 4, Fall/Winter, http://www.etext.org/Politics/AlternativeOrange/4/v4n1\_cpp.html)

The task of this text[1] is to lay bare the structure of assumptions and its relation to the workings of the regime of capital and wage-labor (what I have articulated as “post-al logic"),[2] that unites all these seemingly different texts as they recirculate some of the most reactionary practices that are now masquerading as “progressive” in the postmodern academy. Analyzing the post-al logic of the left is important because it not only **reveals how the ludic left is complicit with capitalism** but, for the more immediate purposes of this text-of-response, it allows us to relate the local discussions in these texts to global problems and to deal, in OR‐2's words, with the “encompassing philosophical issues”[3] that are so violently suppressed by the diversionist uses of “detailism”[4] in these nine texts. Whether they regard themselves to be “new new left," “feminist," “neo-Marxist," or “anarchist," these texts—in slightly different local idioms—do the ideological work of US capitalism by producing theories, pedagogies, arguments, ironies, anecdotes, turns of phrases and jokes that **obscure the laws of motion of capital.** Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of “production” as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on “consumption” and “distribution” as the driving force of the social. The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that “labor," in advanced industrial “democracies," is superseded by “information," and consequently “knowledge” (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the “metaphysics of labor” and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the “outdatedness” of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy—which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler and others have advised)—should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) “mall"—the ultimate site of consumption “with all the latest high-tech textwares” deployed to pleasure the “body." In fact, the post-al left has “invented” a whole new interdiscipline called “cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from “production” to “consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its “progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, [Henry /Robert] Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how “consumption” is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from “production” to “consumption” manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on “superstructural” cultural analysis and **the preoccupation not with the “political economy**” ("base") **but with “representation**"—for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality and identity. This is, for example, one reason for R-2's ridiculing the “base” and “superstructure” analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of “argument” for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that “basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for him/her is to be thrown into an “epistemological gulag”. For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as R-4 puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the “surplus value” is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which “surplus value"—the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor—is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished, rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy, in these texts, therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to “politicizing the classroom” in OR‐1) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned into—through the process that OR‐3 calls “translation"—into “consumable” EXPERIENCES. The more “intense” the experience, as the anecdotes of OR‐3 show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic obscures the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves—many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my “Post-ality” in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that “democracy” is a never-ending, open "dialogue” and “conversation” among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is “power”; that a post-class hegemonic “coalition," as OR‐5 calls it—and not class struggle—is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-2 writes) is an “epistemological gulag"—a construct of power—and thus any form of “ideology critique” that raises questions of “falsehood” and “truth” ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the “other” truths by, in OR‐5 words, “staking sole legitimate claim” to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of “epistemology” is displaced in the ludic academy by “rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the “truth” of a practice but whether it “works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, R-4 is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the “truth” of my texts) end up “cutting our funding?" he/she asks. A post-al leftist like R-4, in short, “resists” the state only in so far as the state does not cut his/her “funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like OR‐5 to conclude that my argument “has little prospect of effectual force” in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of “epistemology” and the erasure of the question of “truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the “truth question” is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism (R-2), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the “difference” of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as R-2 sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of “epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables R-4 to answer my question, “What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is “wrong” with dogmatism, she/he says is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of his/her text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.[5]

And, Criticism itself can never generate revolutionary action—they get stuck in utopian appeals or ethical gestures which mollifies us into avoiding practical, material action

**Alea, Cuban Film Theorist, 1985** (Tomas Gutierrez, “The Viewer's Dialectic”, Jump Cut, No 30, March,

http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/onlinessays/JC30folder/ViewersDialectic2.html)

There's a **paralyzing effect** in criticizing reality but exhausting all action in the making of the critique. Such a mental process tends to consolidate the petit bourgeois mindset, in the sense that this thinking never generates practical action and does not impel people to revolutionary action but rather to decadent conformity. In the best cases, it leads to a kind of blue stocking reformism. In the final instance, it always bears within it an implicit accepting of social evil as something essentially immobile. And thus such criticism promotes utopian solutions or individual consolation. Pondering evil and its eternal character leads to resignation.[10]

 "… **all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism**, by resolution into self-consciousness" or transformation into 'apparitions,' 'specters,' 'fancies,' etc. but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug … not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other types of theory."[11]

And, their appeal to discourse negates the necessity of changing material conditions and is merely a self-righteous attempt of intellectuals to center themselves as a kind of hero, as the new subject of social change, over and opposed to those actually oppressed and disenfranchised

**Poitevin, PhD Cand Sociol @ UC-Davis, 2001**(Rene Francisco, “The end of anti-capitalism as we knew it: Reflections on postmodern Marxism”, TheSocialist Review, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3952/is\_200101/ai\_n8932891)The Postmodern Intellectual as Revolutionary Subject, Or Capitalocentrism Strikes Back

Let us bracket for a moment the limitations of postmodern/post-Marxist epistemologies, together with their "provisional ontology," and focus instead on the merits of their "performative" politics. What is it exactly that has been/can be accomplished politically in this new paradigm? I will point out two results from the postmodern/post-Marxist approach. First, in the postmodern/post-Marxist world, it is the (white, middleclass) postmodern intellectual who gets constituted as the new "revolutionary subject."40 In a political universe controlled by postmodern Marxist physics, where there are no longer objective mechanisms of oppression, but what matters is "rather how... we wish to think of the complex interaction between these [sic] complexities,"" the postmodern intellectual becomes the de facto new vanguard. In a political practice that denies the possibility of objective criteria in deciding what constitutes social phenomena, postmodern intellectuals are the agency in charge of allocating legitimacy to political claims. It is no longer the material conditions or the historical conjuncture of a particular situation that determine what is to be done, but as JK. Gibson-Graham claim, it is "rather how we wish to think" about social problems that constitutes the defining criteria for validity and politics - in a context where the "we" is constituted by a postmodern intelligentsia. Simply put, it is no longer up to the working class, or queer people of color, or women, or the party intellectual, or any other subjectivity to decide which project is legitimate enough to merit recognition - and commitment. In the postmodern Marxist world, the hypereducated postmodern scholar is the one in charge of leading and defining which struggles count and how they will be fought. Simply put, the postmodern intellectual is the new revolutionary subject. One of the most immediate and important tasks in the postmodern/post-Marxist "revolution" is theory production. To paraphrase Lenin, there can be no revolutionary practice without postmodern theory. The reason that postmodern theory is so important is because, as they themselves put it, postmodern Marxism constructs political agency by offering a "range of subject positions that individuals may inhabit, constituting themselves as class subjects with particular political energies and possibilities."42 This, of course, is no small task given that "the production of new knowledges is a world-changing activity, one that repositions other knowledges and empowers new subjects, practices and institutions."43 This privileging of postmodern-theory production, coupled with the unique role conferred on the postmodern intellectual in a political process that privileges discourse at the expense of institutional analysis constitutes (in an ironic twist of fate for people who are so explicitly anti-Leninist) nothing short of a new vanguardism on post-structuralist steroids.

And, capitalism destroys the environment and is the root cause of oppression

**Latin America Solidarity Coalition, 2003** (“Getting to the Roots: Ecology and Environmental Justice”, http://www.lasolidarity.org/papers/enviro.htm)

The globalization of capital and the interweaving of financial and governmental institutions have opened the flood gates for even greater destruction of ecosystems (ecocide) and the annihilation of traditional peoples, cultures and values (genocide) while waging a war on the poor, woman and workers. In this position paper we believe that those who read this are disillusioned with the current condition of life on earth: global forest destruction, increased mono-culture timber plantations, ozone layer depletion, militarism, consumerism, extinction of species, utter collapse of life support systems, racism, air, water and food pollution, chemical warfare, genetic engineering, sweatshops, sexism, fascism and nationalism, abhorrent corporate multinationalism, industrialism and breakdown of community. All of these are exacerbated by the newest ideology of capitalism: neoliberalism. The neoliberalist ideology legitimates corporate control, proposing a "free" global market, whose sole concern is profit and whose primary hindrances are social desires and environmental conservation. Evident in the socio-ecological consequences are agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank (WB), the current proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Neoliberalism further fuels an elite to control the earth and all of its inhabitants, leading to desperation, degradation and suffering.

And, no turns—Language cannot change the OBJECTIVE reality of oppression—this means that their framework can never access our capitalism impacts

**Zavarzadeh, Dept English @ Syracuse, 1994**

(Mas’ud, “The Stupidity that Consumption is Just as Productive as Production”, The Alternative

Orange, V 4, Fall/Winter, http://www.etext.org/Politics/AlternativeOrange/4/v4n1\_cpp.html)

The unsurpassable objectivity which is not open to rhetorical interpretation and constitutes the decided foundation of critique is the “outside” that Marx calls the “Working Day” (Capital 1, 340-416). (R-4 willfully misrecognizes my notion of objectivity by confusing my discussion of identity politics and objectivity.) The working day is not what it seems: its reality, like the reality of all capitalist practices, is an alienated reality—there is a contradiction between its appearance and its essence. It “appears” as if the worker, during the working day, receives wages which are equal compensation for his labor. This mystification originates in the fact that the capitalist pays not for “labor” but for “labor power”: when labor power is put to use it produces more than it is paid for. The “working day” is the site of the unfolding of this fundamental contradiction: it is a divided day; divided into "necessary labor"—the part in which the worker produces value equivalent to his wages—and the “other," the part of “surplus labor"—a part in which the worker works for free and produces “surplus value." The second part of the working day is the source of profit and accumulation of capital. “Surplus labor” is the OBJECTIVE F A C T of capitalist relations of production: without “surplus labor” there will be no profit, and without profit there will be no accumulation of capital, and without accumulation of capital there will be no capitalism. The goal of bourgeois economics is to conceal this part of the working day, and it should therefore be no surprise that, as a protector of ruling class interests in the academy, R-2, with a studied casualness, places “surplus value” in the adjacency of “radical bible-studies” and quietly turns it into a rather boring matter of interest perhaps only to the dogmatic. To be more concise: “surplus labor” is that objective, unsurpassable “outside” that cannot be made part of the economies of the “inside” without capitalism itself being transformed into socialism.

Revolutionary critique is grounded in this truth—objectivity—since all social institutions and practices of capitalism are founded upon the objectivity of surplus labor. The role of a revolutionary pedagogy of critique is to produce class consciousness so as to assist in organizing people into a new vanguard party that aims at abolishing this FACT of the capitalist system and transforming capitalism into a communist society. As I have argued in my “Post-ality” [Transformation 1], (post)structuralist theory, through the concept of “representation," makes all such facts an effect of interpretation and turns them into “undecidable” processes. The boom in ludic theory and Rhetoric Studies in the bourgeois academy is caused by the service it renders the ruling class: it makes the OBJECTIVE reality of the extraction of surplus labor a subjective one—not a decided fact but a matter of “interpretation”. In doing so, it “deconstructs” (see the writings of such bourgeois readers as Gayatri Spivak, Cornell West, and Donna Haraway) the labor theory of value, displaces production with consumption, and resituates the citizen from the revolutionary cell to the ludic shopping mall of R-4. Now that I have indicated the objective grounds of “critique," I want to go back to the erasure of critique by dialogue in the post-al left and examine the reasons why these nine texts locate my critique-al writings and pedagogy in the space of violence, Stalinism and demagoguery. Violence, in the post-al left, is a refusal to “talk”. “To whom is Zavarzadeh speaking?" asks OR‐5, who regards my practices to be demagogical, and R-3, finds as a mark of violence in my texts that “The interlocutor really is absent” from them. What is obscured in this representation of the non-dialogical is, of course, the violence of the dialogical. I leave aside here the violence with which these advocates of non-violent conversations attack me in their texts and cartoon. My concern is with the practices by which the post-al left, through dialogue, naturalizes (and eroticizes) the violence that keeps capitalist democracy in power. What is violent? Subjecting people to the daily terrorism of layoffs in order to maintain high rates of profit for the owners of the means of production or redirecting this violence (which gives annual bonuses, in addition to multi-million dollar salaries, benefits and stock options, to the CEO's of the very corporations that are laying off thousands of workers) against the ruling class in order to end class societies? What is violent? Keeping millions of people in poverty, hunger, starvation, homelessness, and deprived of basic health care, at a time when the forces of production have reached a level that can, in fact, provide for the needs of all people, or trying to over throw this system? What is violent? Placing in office, under the alibi of “free elections," post-fascists (Italy) and allies of the ruling class (Major, Clinton, Kohl, Yeltsin) or struggling to end this farce? What is violent? Reinforcing these practices by “talking” about them in a “reasonable” fashion (i.e. within the rules of the game established by the ruling class for limited reform from “within") or marking the violence of conversation and its complicity with the status quo, thereby breaking the frame that represents “dialogue” as participation—when in fact it is merely a formal strategy for legitimating the established order? Any society in which the labor of many is the source of wealth for the few—all class societies are societies of violence, and **no amount of “talking” is going to change that objective fact.** “Dialogue” and “conversation” are aimed at arriving at a consensus by which this violence is made more tolerable, justifiable and naturalized.

**Dialectical materialism is the only sustainable way to stop political paralysis. Their belief in pure subjectivity separates us from the backdrop of capitalism that determines that subjectivity, making paralysis inevitable.**

Lukacs in 67 (George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness)

The practical danger of every such dualism shows itself in the loss of any directive for action. **As soon as you abandon the ground of reality that has been conquered and reconquered by dialectical materialism, as soon as you decide to remain on the 'natural' ground of existence**, of the empirical in its stark, naked brutality, **you create a gulf between the subject of an action and the milieux of the 'facts' in which the action unfolds** so that they stand opposed to each other as harsh, irreconcilable principles. **It then becomes impossible to impose the subjective will**, wish or decision **upon the facts or to discover in them any directive for action**. A situation in which the 'facts' speak out unmistakably for or against a definite course of action has never existed, and neither can or will exist. The more conscientiously the facts are explored— in their isolation, i.e. in their unmediated relations—the less com-pellingly will they point in any one direction. It is self-evident that a merely subjective decision will be shattered by the pressure of uncomprehended facts acting automatically 'according to laws'. Thus **dialectical materialism is seen to offer the only approach to reality which can give action a direction**. **The self-knowledge,** both subjective and objective, **of the proletariat at a given point in its evolution is at the same time knowledge of the stage of development achieved by the whole society**. **The facts no longer appear strange** when they are comprehended in their coherent reality, in the relation of all partial aspects to their inherent, but hitherto unelucidated roots in the whole: **we then perceive the tendencies which strive towards the centre of reality, to what we are wont to call the ultimate goal**. **This ultimate goal is not an abstract ideal opposed to the process, but an aspect of truth and reality**. **It is the concrete meaning of each stage reached and an integral part of the concrete moment. Because of this, to comprehend it is to recognise the direction taken** (unconsciously) **by events and tendencies towards the totality. It is to know the direction that determines concretely the correct course of action at any given moment**—in terms of the interest of the total process, viz. the emancipation of the proletariat. However, **the evolution of society constantly heightens the tension between the partial aspects and the whole**. Just because the inherent meaning of reality shines forth with an ever more resplendent light, the meaning of the process is embedded ever more deeply in day-to-day events, and totality permeates the spatio-temporal character of phenomena. **The path to consciousness throughout the course of history does not become smoother but** on the contrary **ever more arduous** and exacting. For this reason **the task of orthodox Marxism,** its victory over Revisionism and utopianism **can never mean the defeat**, once and for all, **of false tendencies**. **It is an ever-renewed struggle against the insidious effects of bourgeois ideology on the thought of the proletariat.** **Marxist orthodoxy is no guardian of traditions, it is the eternally vigilant prophet proclaiming the relation between the tasks of the immediate present and the totality of the historical process**. Hence the words of the Communist Manifesto on the tasks of orthodoxy and of its representatives, the Communists, have lost neither their relevance nor their value: "The Communists arc distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independent of nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole" <23-24>

### 3

#### Anav and I advocate the entirety of the 1AC minus the plan text.

#### A. The act of engaging with the state is the root cause of racism --- their project of undermining the biopolitics of the border without realizing that it is the state that causes this racism results in the their political cooption. I’ll quote their 1AC Milchman and Rosenberg 2005 evidence here:

**racism is bound up with the workings of a state that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power. The juxtaposition of - the way biopower functions through - the old sovereign power of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and activation of racism.** And **it is**, I think, **here that we find the actual roots of racism**

#### B. Inclusion of the state supports ‘liberatory’ border politics while also dooming them to corruption – leads to more violence

Zylinska, Professor of New Media and Communications at the University of London, 2004 (Joanna, “The Universal Acts: Judith Butler and the biopolitics of immigration,” Cultural Studies 18.4, pg. 529-30) MM

Indeed, Blunkett’s prophetic vision for Britain as a ‘safe haven’ depends on a number of exclusions firmly in place. First, the Home Secretary affirms that this new vision will only work if we are ‘secure within our sense of belonging and identity’. Significantly, Butler makes it clear that ‘This exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires a simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘‘subjects’’, but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject’ (1993, p. 3). At best a utopian fantasy of homeliness, at worst a conscious foreclosure of ethics of openness to the alterity of the other - an alterity that always poses a challenge to our own security and self-knowledge - Blunkett’s politics of migration therefore seems premised on a logical impossibility.7 It is a hospitality that is in fact based on the originary closure, on foreseeing the foreign threat and trying to avert it. This is the moment when the classical heritage gives way to bizarre miscegenation. Blunkett-Tiresias stops instructing Creon to actually become Creon: a protector of the public sphere whose law both produces and excludes the unlawful, those without the integrity and belonging shared by the members of the polis . For it is this when he goes on to announce: ‘We have fundamental moral obligations which we will always honour’, only to counterbalance this claim with the following reservation: ‘At the same time, those coming into our country have duties that they need to understand and which facilitate their acceptance and integration’. His paradoxical immigration policy of ‘squaring the circle’ is also described as ‘a ‘‘two-way street’’ requiring commitment and action from the host community, asylum seekers and long-term migrants alike’. It is perhaps not surprising (which does not mean it is intentional on Blunkett’s part) that a linguistic paradox is used when outlining our moral obligations and their duties, since the asylum seekers’ position ‘before the law’ itself entails a paradox: even though they are outside it, they are supposedly subject to its power. Constituted as threshold political beings, migrants and ‘asylum seekers’ are defined precisely through their liminal status that places them on the outskirts of the community. Then how can they be expected to ‘have duties’ imposed on them by the host community and manifest commitment to these duties if this very community needs a prior definition of itself, a definition that confirms identity and belonging in relation, or even opposition, to what might threaten it? We also need to consider how the political status of asylum seekers and migrants is actually established. Who legislates the duties that they will be expected to follow? What is the source of the moral obligation that will help Britons ‘manage’ the asylum issue? Agamben explains that ‘The sovereign decides not the licit and the illicit but the originary inclusion of the living in the sphere of law’ (1998, p. 26).8 To what extent, then, is the sovereign entitled to impose the law on those whose identity he defines as being situated ‘before’ the law, both in the spatial and temporal sense? In particular, given that Iraqis constitute the majority of all asylum seekers in the UK, is this conditional openness in the context of the ‘Gulf War II’, not a certain blind spot in the rhetoric and politics of the sovereign government that does not see a connection between the Iraqi refugees from their own country, whose lives are threatened by Western bombs, and the Iraqi asylum seekers trying to come into Britain? This form of politics, with its underlying moral obligations, seems to be based on a certain occluded but inevitable and thus constitutive violence, where ‘the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes into violence’ (Agamben 1998, p. 32).

#### C. State-focused policies cause violence—and their limits arguments reify the impacts of border thinking

Ajana 06, (PhD in Sociology from London School of Economics and Political Science Btihaj. "Immigration Interrupted." Journal for Cultural Research 10.3 (2006): 259-273. Print.)

The fact that technology is an aspect of immanentist biopolitics, is in itself an attestation to how the political has faded into a state of technicism (Coward 1999, p. 18) – a depoliticisation of society in the Agambenian sense – in which governments’ policies and debates are merely technical discussions on the type of mechanisms to be deployed in order to protect borders, filter movements, eliminate infiltrations, and ultimately, sustain sovereignty by means of measurement and exclusion. Biopolitics, nowadays, is too pervasive, too subtle that borders are no longer constituted around the ‘physical’ but actualised in the taken-for-granted institutional-organisational-administrative processes; in the density and ubiquity of information networks. This perpetual actualisation of borders or what we may refer to as ‘infinite bordering’ is enacted into our very ousia, creating far-reaching implications on ‘bodies that do not matter’, bodies of those left to float in the Strait of Gibraltar, bodies of those left to die on the US–Mexican border, bodies of those who are, at this very moment, being raped, tortured and humiliated. Borders are becoming the epitome of Western hypocrisy: on the one hand, they embody visions of Western progress, civilisation and technological advancements. On the other hand, they are turning into mass graves, a monolithic disposal of dispensable bodies and unnecessary existences. This is the dialectical reality of borders!

#### D. State focused debates preclude discussions of individual action – kills effectiveness and agency

Bleiker, professor of International Relations, 2k (Roland, “Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics” pg. 8, Cambridge University Press, igm)

To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understand¬ing of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theor¬ists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises cer¬tain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a cer¬tain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.22

#### E. The state both makes capital a coherent mode of social interaction as well as constitutes the framework for global incorporation of capitalism

**Meszaros 95** (Istavan, Prof. Emeritus @ U of Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, p 65)

The modern state as the comprehensive political command structure of capital — is both the necessary prerequisite for the transformation of capital’s at first fragmented units into a viable system, and the overall framework for the full articulation and maintenance of the latter as a global system. In this fundamental sense the state on account of its constitutive and permanently sustaining role must be understood as an integral part of capital’s material ground itself. Or it contributes in a substantive way not only to the formation and consolidation of all of the major reproductive structures of society but also to their continued functioning. However, the close interrelationship holds also when viewed from the other side. For the modern state itself is quite inconceivable without capital as its social metabolic foundation. This makes the material reproductive structures of the capital system the necessary condition not only for the original constitution but also for the continued survival (and appropriate historical transformations) of the modern state in all its dimensions. These reproductive structures extend their Impact over everything, from the strictly material/repressive instruments cid juridical institutions of the state all the way to the most mediated ideological and political theorizations of its raison d’être and claimed legitimacy. It is on account of this reciprocal determination that we must speak of a close match between the social metabolic ground of the capital system on the one hand, and the modern state as the totalizing political command structure of the established productive and reproductive order on the other. For socialists this is a most uncomfortable and challenging reciprocity. It puts into relief the sobering fact that any intervention in the political domain — even when it envisages the radical overthrow of the capitalist state — can have only a very limited impact in the realization of the socialist project. And the other way round, the corollary of the same sobering fact is that, precisely because socialists have to confront the power of capital’s self-sustaining reciprocity under its fundamental dimensions, it should be never forgotten or ignored - although the tragedy of seventy years (if Soviet experience is that it had been willfully ignored — that there can be no chance of overcoming the power of capital without remaining faithful to the Marxian concern with the ‘withering away’ of the state.

### Case

We live in a world which is increasingly globalized—ours is now a global village whose problems demand solutions of an equally broad scope. The affirmative’s project is emblematic of this approach to the political which can only see the earth as a game board upon which to enact new fantasies of control, all in the name of an abstract common good. Despite their good intentions, this project of ordering authorizes colonial violence in order to remake the world in our image. Their methodology is one which can only alienate us from others, destroying the local concern necessary to effectively respond to oppression.

Jayan **Nayar**, Law—University of Warwick, **1999**

“SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity ,” 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599

It has become a convenience, even an imperative, it seems, to speak in terms of a "global," world. The proliferation of world-order rhetoric is a noticeable feature of contemporary politico-legal, economic and socio-cultural discourse. In politico-legal terms, languages of the "harmonization" and "integration" of polities have gained prominence since the early [\*603] experimentations of the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations. Gradually, it seems, we have moved from a world organized through the isolationism of "coexisting" states, to one co-ordinated by the UN-led interactions of "co-operating" states which have seen the emergence of "internationalism" and "regionalism." Most recently we see a world characterized by a shift, slowly but surely, toward ever greater "interdependence," as reflected through the contemporary mantra of "global governance." In economic and socio- cultural terms, imaginations of a "global village (market-place)" or a "Global Neighborhood," **[4](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n4#n4" \t "_self)** encapsulate this evolution, the final stage toward realizing the aspiration of a "We the Peoples," as contained in the UN Charter, **[5](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n5#n5" \t "_self)** ostensibly to be "connected" through the "world-wide web" of the internet through its many "dot-coms." **[6](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n6#n6" \t "_self)** Driving this movement toward ever greater globality are the new realities of economic and social exchange in human relationships. There appears to be no escaping the bombardment of "globalization-speak." All this, we are told, is in the name of "inclusion" into "one world." **[7](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n7#n7" \t "_self)** Ultimately, what we are witnessing is a nascent "global culture" emerging as an historic movement. The coming together of the peoples of the world is the great challenge of the twenty-first century civilizational project. **[8](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n8#n8" \t "_self)** [\*604] Indeed, much of what provides the descriptive content of world-order narratives appears to be happening. Increased interaction at the global, let alone international, level is taking place. Leisurely meanderings through the streets of any major city, or even minor town, anywhere, provide ample sensory evidence of a globalization-led rise in homogeneity of social experience and aspiration. From advertising hoardings to cinema posters, restaurants to cyber-cafes, shopping malls to banks, hotels to discotheques, muzak to top-tens, fashion of the chic to that of the executive, monocultures prevail. Everywhere, local flavors provide an exotic touch of difference to the otherwise comfortable familiarity of the global. Of course, such leisurely meanderings are limited to those who have the resources by which to make such a comparative study, to those with the mobility to "be anywhere"--the professional, the corporate player, the "global activist," the footloose academic. For these, narratives of a "global world" find appeal. Thus, a "globalized" world-order has come to fit snugly within the common parlance of these "global citizens" (politicians, lawyers, corporate actors, professional NGOists, academics), and world-order possibilities have infused their imaginations. The struggle ahead, from such vantage points, lies in determining what the image of order might be, what the structures of a global order might look like. The rush to capture the symbolic and futuristic landscape of world-order provides us with the rich exhortations of "new beginnings," open to the intellectual expertise of both "right" and "left" politico-economic orientations. These range from the "ordering" inclinations of U.S. State officials asserting the right of "benign imperialism," **[9](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n9#n9" \t "_self)** to the "reordering" demands of progressive internationalists calling for "humane governance" **[10](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n10#n10" \t "_self)** and "neighborhood" perspectives. **[11](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n11#n11" \t "_self)** Regardless of political and ideological orientations, the underlying message of the rhetoric of world-order, however conceptualized, is one of increased human welfare, freed now [\*605] from the ideological constraints of an outdated, geo-politically based state system. A new order for these exciting times is the order of the day. Setting aside these divergent articulations of the vision of world-order, let us locate the rhetoric of world-order within the realm of social experience. The point of our concern is not simply about "world-order-talk," after all, but rather, about the real or potential impacts of world-orders, real or imagined. I suggest we begin this exploration into an alternative narrative on world-order by stepping off the bandwagon of world-order narratives to reflect on the connotations of its very terminology. ¶ What is this "world" that we have in mind when we speak of world-order? What is the nature of "order" that characterizes this world that has come to be the template for our new world-order? What has been the fate and fortune of other "We the Peoples"? **[12](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n12#n12" \t "_self)** Should we seek them out, within this order that has come to be created? Our first challenge, I suggest, is in distinguishing between the imaginations of world-order and the materialities of "world (mis)order(ings)." Order as Evolutionary Structure: The potency of the term "world-order" to mobilize human imagination lies in its appeal to something almost divine: the civilizational project that is the natural path of human evolution, our common destiny, inherently good, bound by the "cords of the heart." **[13](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n13#n13" \t "_self)** In this respect, "order" is presented as standing in opposition to the undesired condition of "disorder." Therefore, to construct an order out of this condition which, at best, is one of nothingness, and at worst, one of chaos and anarchy, stands as a task of historic human responsibility. Being of the "order of things," so to speak, we may regard the project of creating order, of "ordering," as inherent and intrinsic to human history in its movement toward ever greater levels of evolutionary unfolding. This assumption of order gives rise to a Cartesian conception of the organization of human relationships, wherein the progressive evolution of human civilization entails the mechanical, "neutral" and necessary process of amalgamating diversity ("disorder") into an efficient and unitary total structure of world-order. Order as Coercive Command: The flip side of order as "structure" is order as "command." Viewed in this way, it is the present of the coercive process of "ordering" rather than the future of the emancipatory condition/structure of order that becomes emphasized. There is nothing "natural," "evolutionist" or "neutral" about world-order when the command of ordering is made visible. The vision of civilization as mechanical organization of the component parts of "humanity" is no longer tenable when the coercion of command to fit into this order is exposed. World-order, then, no longer describes the "order" of the world open to discovery, but rather, the "ordering" of the world open to conflict. [\*606] Distinguishing these two meanings of "order" provides us with radically opposed directions of analysis and orientations for future imagings of social relations. Although the rhetoric of world-order would focus on visions of some projected "world" that provides the aspiration for collective endeavors, "order" does not come to be without necessary "ordering;" the "world" of "world-order" has not come to be without the necessary ordering of many worlds. The ordering and the ordered, the world of order and the ordered world, all are inextricable parts of the past and the present of "civil-ization." Despite the vision of world-order founded on a notion of a universal society of humankind aspiring toward a universal common good, (first given meaning within a conceptual political-legal framework through the birth of the so-called "Westphalian" state system **[14](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n14#n14" \t "_self)** ), the materialities of "ordering" were of a different complexion altogether. Contrary to the disembodied rhetoric of world-order as bloodless evolution, the new images of the world and languages of "globality" did not evolve out of a sense of "hospitality" **[15](https://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7cbb43c6c45b52d15e729135748f3f9e&csvc=bl&cform=searchForm&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAl&_md5=b25a19e5a965f11cd703cdaeac6cd47c" \l "n15#n15" \t "_self)** to the "other," the "stranger." Rather, the history of the creation of the post-Westphalian "world" as one world, can be seen to be most intimately connected with the rise of an expansionist and colonizing world-view and practice. Voyages of "discovery" provided the necessary reconnaissance to image this "new world." Bit by bit, piece by piece, the jigsaw of the globe was completed. With the advance of the "discoverer," the "colonizer," the "invader," the "new" territories were given meaning within the hermeneutic construct that was the new "world." [\*607] The significance of this evolution of the world does not, however, lie merely in its acquiring meaning. It is not simply the "idea" of the world that was brought to prominence through acts of colonization. The construction of the "stage" of the world has also occurred, albeit amid the performance of a violent drama upon it. The idea of a single world in need of order was followed by a succession of chained and brutalized bodies of the "other." The embodied world that has been in creation from the "colonial" times to the present could not, and does not, accommodate plurality. The very idea of "one world" contains the necessary impetus for the absorption, assimilation, if not destruction, of existing worlds and the genocide of existing socialities. This violence of "order-ing" within the historical epoch of colonialism is now plainly visible.

Attempts to explain violence in abstract and formulaic terms shield individuals from any responsibility for their actions. The 1AC’s advantage arguments are a prime example of this description of violence as the inevitable result of a chain of events which naturalizes it and washes the hands of those who actually decide to commit acts of violence.

Susanne **Kappeler**, Associate Prof @ Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, **1995**, pg 14

What is striking is that the violence which is talked about is always the violence committed by someone else: women talk about the violence of men, adults about the violence of young people; the left, liberals and the centre about the violence of right extremists; the right, centre and liberals about the violence of leftist extremists; political activists talk about structural violence, police and politicians about violence in the `street', and all together about the violence in our society. Similarly, Westerners talk about violence in the Balkans, Western citizens together with their generals about the violence of the Serbian army. Violence is recognized and measured by its visible effects, the spectacular blood of wounded bodies, the material destruction of objects, the visible damage left in the world of `objects'. In its measurable damage we see the proof that violence has taken place, the violence being reduced to this damage. The violation as such, or invisible forms of violence - the non-physical violence of threat and terror, of insult and humiliation, the violation of human dignity - are hardly ever the issue except to some extent in feminist and anti-racist analyses, or under the name of psychological violence. Here violence is recognized by the victims and defined from their perspective - an important step away from the catalogue of violent acts and the exclusive evidence of material traces in the object. Yet even here the focus tends to be on the effects and experience of violence, either the objective and scientific measure of psychological damage, or the increasingly subjective definition of violence as experience. Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for politics to get a grip on. But violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behaviour of people, human action which may be analysed. What is missing is an analysis of violence as action - not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effects, but as the actions of people in relation to other people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as other political critiques, has analysed the preconditions of violence, the unequal power relations which enable it to take place. However, under the pressure of mainstream science and a sociological perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking, it is becoming standard to argue as if it were these power relations which cause the violence. Underlying is a behaviourist model which prefers to see human action as the exclusive product of circumstances, ignoring the personal decision of the agent to act, implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate certain forms of behaviour. Even though we would probably not underwrite these propositions in their crass form, there is nevertheless a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behaviour by its circumstances. (Compare the question, `Does pornography cause violence?') The circumstances identified may differ according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation remains the same. While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful place in a court of law trying (and defending) an offender, this does not automatically make it an adequate or sufficient practice for political analysis. It begs the question, in particular, `What is considered to be part of the circumstances (and by whom)?' Thus in the case of sexual offenders, there is a routine search - on the part of the tabloid press or professionals of violence - for experiences of violence in the offender's own past, an understanding which is rapidly solidifying in scientific model of a `cycle of violence'. That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant past and in other contexts of action, e a crucial factor in the present context is ignored, namely the agent's decision to act as he did. Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as the result of racist oppression. The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it. Although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence, that is, that these circumstances do not `cause' violent behaviour. They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has decided to violate, even if this decision was made in circumstances of limited choice. To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular interests. In the first instance it serves to exonerate the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to circumstances and a history for which other people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps to stigmatize all those living in poverty and oppression; because they are obvious victims of violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators themselves.' This slanders all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others, and libels those experiencing racist and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence. Far from supporting those oppressed by classist, racist or sexist oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the interest of exonerating individual members. It is a version of collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the mainstream division of society into so-called marginal groups - the classic clienteles of social work and care politics (and of police repression) - and an implied `centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers and careers themselves belong, and which we are to assume to be a zone of non-violence. Explaining people's violent behaviour by their circumstances also has the advantage of implying that the `solution' lies in a change to circumstances. Thus it has become fashionable among socially minded politicians and intellectuals in Germany to argue that the rising neo-Nazi violence of young people (men), especially in former East Germany, needs to be countered by combating poverty and unemployment in these areas. Likewise anti-racist groups like the Anti. Racist Alliance or the Anti-Nazi League in Britain argue that `the causes of racism, like poverty and unemployment, should be tackled and that it is `problems like unemployment and bad housing which lead to racism'.' Besides being no explanation at all of why (white poverty and unemployment should lead specifically to racist violence (and what would explain middle- and upper-class racism), it is more than questionable to combat poverty only (but precisely) when and where violence is exercised. It not only legitimates the violence (by `explaining' it), but constitutes an incentive to violence, confirming that social problems will be taken seriously when and where `they attract attention by means of violence - just as the most unruly children in schools (mostly boys) tend to get more attention from teachers than well-behaved and quiet children (mostly girls). Thus if German neo-Nazi youths and youth groups, since their murderous assaults on refugees and migrants in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Dresden etc., are treated to special youth projects and social care measures (to the tune of DM 20 million per year), including `educative' trips to Morocco and Israel,' this is am unmistakable signal to society that racist violence does indeed 'pay off'

Ultimately their call to identify with the State—even towards the ends of criticizing status quo policy—psychologically orients us in relation to institutions such that we trade personal agency for blind loyalty. Having tied their pride to the whims of policymakers, ordinary people are lives are rendered meaningless as they are reduced to serving as a cheer brigade for violence abroad, or as the welcoming committee for totalitarianism at home. Instead of training us to perpetuate endless cycles of violence, use your ballot to enact a psychological break between ourselves and those institutions which claim to represent us. Only a refusal to displace our agency with State action will stop us from mapping the dark urges within each of us onto the globe.

Butler **Shaffer**, Southwestern University School of Law, **2007**.

Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective.¶ In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, **institutions take over the direction of our minds,** twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense.¶ Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, **the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning,** not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical.¶ **It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state.** It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being.¶ The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval.¶ The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not.¶ ¶ It is **not** the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. **Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible.** What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic.¶ **Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action**. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have **more transitory relationships**. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.”¶ One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our **loss of** control over not only the **meaning** and direction **in our lives,** but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us.¶ As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to **mobilize our “dark side” energies** in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of **psychological projection.** Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. **The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto** others (i.e., “**scapegoats**”) **and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings.**¶ The state has **trained us** to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the **enemy du jour.** It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies.¶ Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. **The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage** the lives of billions of people – along with **the planet upon which we live! – and we are** now **experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility.**¶ We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition.¶ ¶ By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) **we give up** the integrated life, **the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us.** While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – **simply taken over the territory we have abandoned.¶** Our **politico-centric** pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed **external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being.** The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.